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Over the last years, Location-Based Services (LBSs) have become popular due to the global use of
smartphones and improvement in Global Positioning System (GPS) and other positioning methods.
Location-based services employ users’ location to offer relevant information to users or provide them
with useful recommendations. Meanwhile, with the development of social applications, location-
based social networking services (LBSNS) have attracted millions of users because the geographic
position of users can be used to enhance the services provided by those social applications. Proximity
detection, as one type of location-based function, makes LBSNS more flexible and notifies mobile
users when they are in proximity. Despite all the desirable features that such applications provide,
disclosing the exact location of individuals to a centralized server and/or their social friends might
put users at risk of falling their information in wrong hands, since locations may disclose sensitive
information about people including political and religious affiliations, lifestyle, health status, etc.
Consequently, users might be unwilling to participate in such applications.
To this end, private proximity detection schemes enable two parties to check whether they are in
close proximity while keeping their exact locations secret. In particular, running a private proximity
detection protocol between two parties only results in a boolean value to the querier. Besides, it
guarantees that no other information can be leaked to the participants regarding the other party’s
location. However, most proposed private proximity detection protocols enable users to choose only
a simple geometric range on the map, such as a circle or a rectangle, in order to test for proximity.
In this thesis, we take inspiration from the field of Computational Geometry and develop two
privacy-preserving proximity detection protocols that allow a mobile user to specify an arbitrary
complex polygon on the map and check whether his/her friends are located therein. We also ana-
lyzed the efficiency of our solutions in terms of computational and communication costs. Our eval-
uation shows that compared to the similar earlier work, the proposed solution increases the compu-
tational efficiency by up to 50%, and reduces the communication overhead by up to 90%. Therefore,
we have achieved a significant reduction of computational and communication complexity.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, improvements in sensors and global positioning system (GPS) de-
vices, as well as wireless communication technology, have resulted in a location-
dependent information access paradigm, known as Location Based Services (LBS).
Therefore, social networks, monitoring devices, and consumer-oriented applications
can be enriched with locational data reported by users about where they are or how
they are moving. These locational data can be employed to provide users with useful
services such as location-based queries, location-based social recommendations, traffic
monitoring, etc [Ghi13].
A location-based social networking service (LBSNS) combines social networking fea-
tures with location-based services in which the geographical locations of mobile users
are utilized to provide them with some notifications, e.g., informing users whether
a social friend of them is in close proximity. This is called proximity detection.
However, the repeated release of information about the geographical location of
mobile users raises serious concerns about the leaking and misusing of user location
data. Since location data can be linked to a variety of information about individuals,
collecting and analyzing location data would divulge some sensitive information
about users including political views, sexual habits, religious affiliations, etc. To
illustrate how the privacy of users might be violated by disclosing their exact location
to an LBS, consider the following example.
Assume that Bob is looking for the nearest betting office using his mobile phone.
A list of betting offices in his vicinity can be shown to him by a LBS in a publicly
available web server (e.g., Google Maps, Mapquest). Since Bob is cautious about
disclosing his gambling habits to Alice, he does not send his query directly to the
LBS provider. Instead, he establishes an SSL connection with an anonymizer, which
is a trusted server, in order to remove his user id from the query and to send it to
the LBS. The answer is forwarded to Bob through the anonymizer. Here, the LBS
provider needs the exact coordinates of the user in order to find his nearest betting
office. Consider a scenario where Alice collaborates with the LBS and collects the
query results along with the coordinates of users. It is not a difficult task for
Alice to relate the coordinates to a specific user. For example, the location of
users can be estimated by the phone companies within 50-300 meters (E911). Alice
can triangulate Bob’s mobile phone’s signal to conclude which of the query results
belongs to Bob. Other techniques include observing Bob in a specific place at the
2query time or using publicly available databases for relating coordinates to users’
address [KGMP07].
In practice, once users feel that by using a public LBS provider, their lifestyles or
their political/religious affiliations are at risk of being disclosed to the wrong party,
they might be reluctant to use such services. In addition, once the identity of the
query source is revealed to the LBS, users may face unwanted advertisements, e-
coupons, etc. Therefore, preserving location privacy is a fundamental requirement
towards the prosperous deployment of location-based applications.
The techniques of Secure Multi-party Computation have brought many opportunities
for cooperative computation, where untrusted companies or competitors are able to
compute one function based on their own private inputs, ensuring that no party
can derive more information except that what can be computed from a party’s own
input and the common output. The multi-party computation was first introduced
by Yao [Yao82] and extended by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW87]. The
suggested methodology in these works is to represent each functionality F as a
Boolean circuit and then the participants run a protocol for every gate in the circuit.
However, if the functionality F is complicated, their suggested solution will not be
practical. This is the motivation for seeking special efficient solutions to specific
cooperative computational problems.
1.1 Motivation
Secure multi-party computational geometry has got a wide range of applications in
recent years. Its main goal is to design and implement privacy-preserving proto-
cols for several geometric problems where each entity has its own private data. In
[DA01b], the authors investigate a number of specific geometric problems including
the intersection of two shapes, range searching, finding the convex hulls, point-
inclusion problem, etc. In this work, we focus on the point-inclusion problem and
design two privacy-preserving protocols that cover all arbitrary polygonal domains
(except self-intersecting polygons). Here, we describe the problem with more detail
and present some applications where a secure point-inclusion protocol is required.
Privacy-preserving point-inclusion problem : Alice has a polygon P and Bob
has a private point M . They want to jointly figure out whether the point M lies
inside the polygon P or not, without revealing any additional information to another
party. Alice does not want to disclose any information about her polygon to Bob
3(e.g, shape, size and its location), and likewise, Bob wants to hide the exact location
of his point from Alice. Besides, Alice and Bob can only determine whether the point
M is inside the polygon P or outside of it. Neither of them is allowed to learn the
relative position between the polygon P and the point M , such as whether M is in
the close distance of one of the polygon edges, or whetherM is at the southeast side
of P , and so on.
Applications :
The point-inclusion problem has a wide range of applications in secure positioning
scenarios. For example, authors in [SS05] discuss the privacy concerns in pervasive
sensor networks where users’ voice, motion, or even body temperature are super-
vised. In such an environment, people want to know whether their current positions
are being sensed, while the monitoring company does not want to reveal the sensing
area. Using a privacy-preserving point-inclusion protocol, users can check whether
they are located in the sensing area or not.
Another application of the point-inclusion problem is proximity detection, where a
user can choose a geometric range on the map and query which friends of her/his are
located inside the selected area. For example, Alice would like to enjoy her weekend
at one religious festival held in the city center. She is interested to know whether
her friend Catherine is also attending the festival in order to arrange some activities
together. Using privacy-preserving proximity testing, she can determine if Catherine
is located in that area before calling her. Another example can be as follows. Carol
is a student who lands at an airport near her university. She is interested to check
if one of her classmates is currently at the airport and can give her a ride to campus
[NTL+11].
1.2 Contributions and outline
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. We introduce an algorithm for
solving the point-inclusion problem in complex polygonal domains without worrying
about privacy concern (see Section 4.2). Then, we utilize the aforementioned algo-
rithm to design and develop two privacy-preserving proximity detection protocols
that allow one party to choose an arbitrary geographical area on the map and check
whether his/her friends are located therein (see Section 4.3). We build our schemes
based on public-key homomorphic encryption. Finally, we assess the security and
performance aspects of the two suggested protocols. Our evaluation result shows
4that the first solution outperforms a similar suggested protocol in terms of com-
putational complexity and communication overhead. Whereas the second solution
provides stronger privacy protection for both parties during the protocol execution.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background
information. In Chapter 3 we explain the cryptographic and geometric primitives
that are considered as building blocks for understanding the rest of our work. The
system model and security requirements are formalized in Chapter 4, followed by an
algorithm that solves the point-inclusion problem in a straightforward way without
worrying about the privacy concern. Moreover, two new privacy-preserving proto-
cols for the point-inclusion problem that covers all arbitrary polygonal domains are
proposed in this chapter. Next, Chapter 5 evaluates the security and performance
aspects of two proposed privacy-preserving schemes in the form of an analytical
study. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the overall conclusions and suggestions for future
work.
52 Background
This chapter studies the background information. The concept of privacy is dis-
cussed in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 provides a basic understanding of location-based
services and outlines the most commonly used LBSs. Section 2.3 surveys the related
work and categorizes them into location privacy and private proximity detection.
2.1 Privacy
Privacy is a concept that has been studied in various fields for more than 100 years.
In [pri02], many definitions and aspects of privacy are surveyed. Since the 1960s,
information technology has had a significant impact on the way that we live, there-
fore, information privacy has been extensively investigated during the last decades.
Information privacy bridges the gap between massive data collection/processing and
the legal/political/technological issues surrounding them.
It is obvious that technological advancements provide our society with numerous
advantages. However, employing them in everyday life raise serious concerns about
misusing of users’ data. Nowadays, huge amounts of data is created about people
while they browse the WWW, connect with their friends using online social networks
or employ their mobile phones. Mobile devices are typically equipped with position
sensors (e.g., GPS receivers) to process physical location. Processing such data is
very critical as it might disclose sensitive information about the private lives of users.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, tremendous interest in user data has resulted
in the existence of many companies whose core business are formed by collecting
data, processing it and monetizing the result. It is estimated that about 50 billion
devices will be connected to the Internet in 2023. Consequently, electronic devices
are able to communicate with each other resulting in the creation of more data.
Therefore, artificial intelligence algorithms have enough data to analyze every single
part of our lives. Users are typically unaware to figure out how and by whom their
data is being processed [Her16].
It should be noted that in our society, the necessity for exchanging information can
be seen as a building block for connecting people together, getting access to useful
services and many more. For example, people need to reveal their address and bank
account information for gym registration, tell their friends about their holiday plans
and so on. A user wants to share her information only with intended receivers.
6According to Westin [Wes67], privacy is related to informational self-determination.
Individuals should have the right to decide which information about them in which
situations should be divulged. Therefore, information privacy is a relational concept
that depends on the entities being involved.
2.1.1 Privacy Protection
According to Danezis and Gürses [DG10], all proposed Privacy Technologies can
be separated into Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and Privacy-Preserving
Data Publishing and Mining. The latter includes technologies that analyze personal
information databases in a privacy-preserving manner. This is mostly achieved by
employing cryptographic primitives. While PETs investigate technologies such as
anonymizers which make users anonymous within a set of others. Tor [DMS04] is
the most widely used anonymizer.
Authors in [DG10] categorize PETs into three categories as follows: privacy as
confidentiality, privacy as control and privacy as practice. Privacy as confidentiality
provides users with different technologies to prevent information from being revealed
to the public. For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) can be utilized
to provide confidentiality of the message content. While Tor provides confidentiality
of the message content, it also protects its users from being monitored. Privacy as
control refers to informational self-determination. Identity Management Systems
(IMS) and Single Sign-On (SSO) systems are the most widely used technologies
that provide users with the possibility to control which information of them should
be revealed to which entity. Finally, privacy as practice can be seen as an extension
to privacy as control. Users not only can decide about what information is revealed
to which service, but they also are capable of understanding how information is
being transmitted, aggregated and used.
In [BN11], Brunton and Nissenbaum propose obfuscation as another technique re-
lated to privacy as confidentiality, in order to protect user privacy. In obfuscation,
users hide their data among a set of false information in order to make data col-
lecting less valuable and less reliable. Therefore, it is hard to learn about users’
sensitive information.
72.2 Location-Based Services
Location-based services (LBSs) are services that use the location of the client for
adding value to the service. The added value could be filtering of information and
selecting the neighboring point of interests, or activating the service when a user
enters or leaves a predefined location [Küp05].
Location-based services can be categorized into reactive and proactive LBSs [Küp05].
In reactive LBS, the user invokes the service and establishes a service session. Then
he requests for certain information, for example, a list of nearby gas stations, where-
upon the service collects and processes location data and sends the result back to
the user. Thus, a reactive LBS is activated by the user and characterized by a syn-
chronous interaction between user and service. Proactive LBSs, on the other hand,
are activated automatically when the user enters or leaves a certain point of interest.
For example, an electronic tourist guide which informs people via SMS as soon as
they approach a landmark. In proactive LBSs, users are continuously tracked by
the service in order to inform them about some location events.
Furthermore, there are two types of queries that can be issued to a location-based
server: snapshot and continuous queries. Examples of snapshot queries include
"find the closest restaurant" or "where is nearest post office within one mile of my
location". In continuous queries, users continuously provide the server with their
accurate location in order to obtain the precise answer for their queries, for example,
"report the location of the closest parking lot while driving a car".
In LBSs, the lack of sufficient controls may disclose the individuals’ personal infor-
mation which causes privacy concerns.
Design of Private Location-Based Services
Protecting users’ privacy is the most challenging part in designing a private LBS,
therefore, most private LBSs are designed for a specific use-case and cannot be
reused for other use-cases. Moreover, users cannot trust in all cases the service
provider and do not share their accurate location with it. In most private LBSs, the
service provider is assumed to be honest-but-curious, thus it tries to learn as much
as possible about its users. In the following, the more commonly used private LBSs
are outlined [Her16].
• Geo-Social Networks (GSNs) employ both functionalities of LBSs and
online social networks to provide their users with the ability to share their
8whereabouts with friends. Other features of GNSs are to find nearby contacts
and providing clients with some recommendations related to points of interest
in their vicinity. However, the core functionality of any GSNs is location-
sharing. In such services, for example, Alice and Bob wish to share their
location with each other without revealing the exact location to a malicious
party. In [Her16], the author surveys a variety of proposed techniques aimed
at location privacy protection while users share their exact location with each
other.
• Friend-Nearby Notification Services are designed in such a way to inform
users about whether a friend of them is in close proximity [ZGH07]. In these
services, for example, Alice and Bob engage in a private protocol in order
to learn if they are close to each other or, in some proposed approaches, they
even learn the accurate location of the other party. A friend-nearby notification
service should detect and prevent users’ misbehavior. For example, if Alice lies
about her location thus she can learn about Bob’s location without disclosing
her own location. Consequences of such misbehavior lead to privacy violations.
• Traffic Monitoring Services are another type of common LBSs which offer
a statistical infrastructure in order to route traffic in a more efficient way
[HGXA06]. Each vehicle is equipped with some sensors and tracking devices to
report to a LBS some information, such as its current speed, continuously. The
LBS analyzes the information received from vehicles to compute statistics that
can be used to navigate cars as well as detecting traffic jams, etc. However,
since these applications require frequent updates of the user’s position, the
user’s privacy may be violated by a location tracking attack. If an attacker
tracks a vehicle over the time, he can find some confidential information about
its driver.
• Point-of-Interest (POI) Finder is one of the most popular LBSs that allows
mobile users to look for interesting places, such as restaurants or shopping
centers. In POI finder, the user issues a query like ’Where is the nearest
restaurant’ or ’what are the gas stations within one mile of my location’. In
response, a list of candidates is forwarded to the user.
92.3 Related Works
In this section, related work on location privacy and private proximity detection are
reviewed. Most related and recent techniques designed to provide location privacy
for LBS users can be categorized into two main groups: (i) schemes which rely on
Trusted Third Parties (TTP-based schemes) and (ii) TTP-free schemes.
The main idea of TTP-based schemes is to utilize a trusted third party as a location
anonymizer in order to blur users’ location information before sending them to
LBSs. Most proposed architectures in this category employ k-anonymity model
[Swe02, GL08] and spatial cloaking techniques [CML06, CML11, WW10].
In k-anonymity model if the probability of recognizing the user who queries an LBS
does not exceed 1/k, then a query is considered private. The main responsibility of
an anonymizer is to construct a Cloaking Region (CR) including a query user and
k−1 other subscribed users in her vicinity. Therefore, the locations of k users will be
masked into a cloaked area, and are indistinguishable. Spatial cloaking techniques
are generally used for generating CR by an anonymizer to protect the privacy of
LBS users. However, this approach has some weaknesses. If k users are in the
same location, such as an airport, their location might be disclosed to an attacker.
Besides, the anonymizer is considered as a single point of attack. Therefore, if an
attacker gains access to it, users’ location privacy is violated.
In TTP-free schemes, two main components at query time are users and the LBS
provider. In [GKK+08] Ghinita et al. propose two protocols for implementing a
POI finder in a privacy-preserving way without using a trusted party. Their method
is based on the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [CKGS98, KO97] theory that
makes it possible for a client to privately query a database on the server for a partic-
ular piece of information without revealing the query to the server. Both protocols
employ space-partitioning data structures like kd-tree or R-tree to transform LBS
queries to index-based queries. However, the drawback of their solution is that PIR
is computationally heavy on the service provider.
Most related works on private proximity detection, such as FriendLocator [ŠTŠ+09]
and VicinityLocator [ŠTŠY10], partition the whole space into a fixed number of cells.
Therefore, the proximity detection problem is turned into the equality testing prob-
lem aiming to determine whether two parties are located inside the same or nearby
cells. Zhong et al. [ZGH07] proposed three protocols, namely Louis, Lester, and
Pierre in order to compute the distance between two parties using the homomorphic
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encryption. Longitude [MBF09] is another proposed privacy-preserving protocol for
proximity detection that is based on a centralized architecture.
More similar to our work are protocols for secure point inclusion problem which
was first presented by Atallah and Du [AD01]. Their suggested protocol for solving
the point inclusion problem is based on two sub-protocols: secure two-party scalar
product and secure two-party vector dominance protocol. In the former, Alice has
a vector A = (a1, ..., an) and Bob has a vector B = (b1, ..., bn). After the protocol
execution, Alice (not Bob) gets A ·B + v where v is a random secret known only to
Bob. Their proposed solution is as follows. First, vector A is divided into m random
vectors V1, ..., Vm such that A =
∑m
i=1 Vi. For each Vi, Alice sends p vectors to Bob,
only one of which is Vi and the rest are arbitrary. Accordingly, Bob computes the
scalar products between each of these p vectors and B. Alice then employs 1-out-of-p
oblivious transfer protocol [Gol98] to obtain Vi ·B+ri from Bob, where ri is a random
number and v =
∑m
i=1 ri. Finally, Alice can calculate
∑m
i=1(Vi ·B + ri) = A ·B + v.
It should be pointed out that the idea behind this approach is utilized in our work
presented later (Section 4.3.2). Similarly, in the secure two-party vector dominance
protocol, Alice wants to privately check whether vector A dominates vector B. If
A dominates B, then for all i = 1, ..., n, we have ai > bi. Their solution for this
problem is based on Yao’s Millionaire protocol [Yao82].
By utilizing the two aforementioned protocols, Atallah and Du [AD01] proposed
one O(n) protocol for the point-location problem where n is the number of edges
of the polygon. Their algorithm in a straightforward way without worrying about
privacy concern is as follows. Assume Alice has a point A = (α, β) and Bob has
a polygon with n edges. The algorithm starts by finding the leftmost vertex l and
rightmost vertex r of the polygon. Then all edges of the polygon are divided into two
boundaries by a diagonal between l and r. Therefore, if the point A is above all the
edges of the lower boundary and below all the edges of the upper boundary, then the
point A is located inside the polygon, otherwise it is outside. It should be noted that
this solution only covers the convex polygonal domains. Besides, since the vector
dominance protocol involves several executions of Yao’s Millionaire protocol, their
approach is inefficient and computationally expensive. However, their protocol has
been recently employed in [SS05] to privately determine whether a user is located
inside the sensing area of a pervasive sensor network.
In [Tho09], Thomas studied the point inclusion problem in a star-shaped domain
and a more general polygonal domain. He proposed three protocols including two
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protocols for the star-shaped domain with round complexities O(n) and O(log n)
respectively, and one protocol for the more general polygonal domain with round
complexity O(n), where n is the number of vertices of the given polygon. His
algorithm for the star-shaped domain is as follows. Assume P is a polygon with
vertices Pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which are named in the counter-clockwise direction. A
star-shaped domain P always contains a point Q such that all line segments joining
Q to Pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are completely inside P . The next step employs binary
search algorithm in order to find the wedge bounded by the rays
−−→
QPi and
−−−→
QPi+1 in
which a given point M lies. After finding Pi and Pi+1, then M is inside P if the
angle between Pi, Pi+1 and M is a left turn. More details about his work can be
found in [Tho09].
Mu et al. [MB16] solved the point-inclusion problem for arbitrary convex polygonal
domains. Their approach employs a secure two-party computational protocol which
is based on Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem in order to test whether a given point
lies inside a convex polygon or not. Besides, they suggested a solution for handling
an arbitrary concave polygon by partitioning the concave polygon into the minimum
number of convex pieces using computational geometry algorithms. Therefore, their
scheme can be invoked multiple times to evaluate the proximity query. In contrast
to their protocol, our scheme can be employed to all complex polygonal domains
(i.e, all arbitrary concave or convex polygons) without any additional cost.
In [LD05] Li et al. studied the point-location problem for a circular domain. How-
ever, their solution reveals some additional information about each party’s location
to the other party. Moreover, their solution is highly inefficient. Later, an efficient
protocol for point-circle inclusion problem was proposed by Luo, Huang and Zhong
[LHZ07] which is based on a two-round protocol for calculating the distance between
two private points. In their protocol, only one party gets the output and the other
party should trust the knowledgeable one for the output. Moreover, in [JKS+18]
multiple privacy-preserving location proximity schemes are proposed which are ap-
plicable to the point-circle inclusion problem. Other similar works are discussed in
[YSZ11, YSZ12, YLWY10].
In this thesis, we consider the point-inclusion problem in complex polygonal do-
mains and propose two privacy-preserving schemes. Our solution provides a signif-
icant reduction in computational and communication complexity compared to the
similar work.
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3 Preliminaries
This chapter introduces the cryptographic and geometric primitives as well as basic
concepts in Linear Algebra which will be utilized throughout the rest of this thesis.
3.1 Attacker Model
In the most general setting, we consider n parties jointly running a cryptographic
protocol. We will assume that a potential attacker has corrupted a subset of the
participating parties, has access to their data and controls the way they interact
with the other parties when running the protocol. We will distinguish between two
types of attackers (adversarial behavior) which will be described in this section.
3.1.1 Semi-honest Attacker Model
A semi-honest (known also as honest-but-curious) adversary follows the protocol
correctly and does not send any fake information, however, he attempts to deduce
as much information as possible from exchanged messages during the protocol execu-
tion. For example, he might record all intermediate computations to learn something
from the other parties, but he does not act to corrupt, replace or drop messages.
This adversary model is discussed in detail in [Gol09, Chapter 7.2].
3.1.2 Malicious Attacker Model
Another type of attacker is malicious adversary (known also as an active attacker).
A malicious attacker attempts to manipulate the normal execution of the protocol
in order to infer some susceptible information about the other parties. Moreover, he
might try to send corrupted information to prevent the protocol from terminating
with an accurate output. A well known and widely used way for transforming a
secure protocol in the semi-honest adversary model into one that is secure against
malicious attackers is presented in [Gol09, Chapter 7.4]. This is accomplished by
forcing the active attacker to behave in a semi-honest manner. Typically, protocols
secure against active adversaries are not as efficient as protocols that are secure in
the semi-honest attacker model. More details can be found in [Gol09, Chapter 7.4].
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3.2 Cryptographic Preliminaries
The cryptographic concepts utilized as a building block into our work are defined
in the following. Readers who are interested in more details can use Handbook of
Applied Cryptography [KMVOV96] as a reference.
3.2.1 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer
In this thesis, we design one protocol for the point-inclusion problem that consider-
ably depends on 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol [BCR86, EGL85]. At the
beginning of this protocol, one party (Alice) has N inputs A1, ..., AN and the other
party (Bob) is interested to learn the input Ai, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N . At the end
of the protocol, Bob only learns the input Ai without learning anything about the
other inputs and without allowing Alice to know which input has been retrieved. In
[NP99] Naor and Pinkas propose an efficient 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol.
Recently, the simplest and most efficient protocol for 1-out-of-N OT is presented in
[CO15] which is a simple tweak of the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol.
3.2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption demonstrates a group of semantically secure encryption
functions that allow performing certain algebraic operations directly on the cipher-
text without first decrypting them. Many public-key cryptosystems are partially
homomorphic. It means that they facilitate the evaluation of addition or multipli-
cation directly on the ciphertext space. In this thesis, we employ additively homo-
morphic encryption which has the following properties. First, given two encryptions
E(m1) and E(m2), we can compute the encryption of m1+m2 by multiplying their
encryptions.
E(m1 +m2) = E(m1) · E(m2)
Second, an encrypted value E(m) can be multiplied by a constant k as follows:
E(k ·m) = E(m)k
In our implementation, we employ Paillier [Pai99] which is an additively homomor-
phic cryptosystem.
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3.2.3 The Paillier-Encryption Scheme
The Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99] is an additive homomorphic public-key cryptosys-
tem which was invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999. In this section, we first describe
the key generation process, the encryption and the decryption operation. We then
demonstrate the homomorphic properties of the scheme.
Key Generation
1. Compute N = pq, where p and q are randomly selected large prime numbers.
2. Compute λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1), where lcm means Least Common Multiple.
3. Select a generator g where g ∈ Z∗N2 so that the order of g is a nonzero multiple
of N . This can easily be validated by checking the equation
gcd(L(gλ mod N2), N) = 1
where function L is defined as L(u) =
u− 1
N
.
4. The public key is the pair (N, g).
5. The private key is λ.
Encryption
1. We want to encrypt a plaintext m ∈ ZN .
2. Select a random number r ∈ ZN .
3. Compute the ciphertext c using c = gmrN mod N2.
It should be noted that while we choose a plaintext in ZN , we generate a ciphertext
modulo N2. Thus, the ciphertext space is Z∗N2 .
Decryption
1. We want to decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗N2 .
2. Compute the plaintext m using m =
L(cλ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N.
Note that Paillier cryptosystem is probabilistic, i.e., ciphertexts of a plaintext m
differ between encryptions with high probability. This is due to the use of different
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random blinding factor r. As a result, Paillier scheme is resistant to dictionary
attacks.
Homomorphic Properties Paillier scheme is additively homomorphic on ZN . This
is easy to prove. Given two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Z∗N2 , we know that there exist
m1,m2 ∈ ZN and r1, r2 ∈ ZN such that c1 = gm1rN1 mod N2 and c2 = gm2rN2 mod
N2. Now we have:
D(c1 · c2) = D(gm1rN1 mod N2 · gm2rN2 mod N2)
= D(g(m1+m2)(r1r2)
N mod N2)
= m1 +m2
= D(c1) +D(c2)
The reason why we utilize the Paillier encryption scheme in our privacy-preserving
schemes is the following equations:
∀m1,m2 ∈ ZN and k ∈ N
D(E(m1)E(m2) mod N
2) = m1 +m2 mod N
D(E(m)k mod N2) = km mod N.
Another secure and efficient additively homomorphic encryption scheme that could
be employed instead is DGK [DGK07].
3.2.4 Encrypting Negative Integers
The message space ZN consists of positive integers only, hence in order to represent
negative integers, we take advantage of the cyclic property of the Paillier cryptosys-
tem. If the message space is m ∈ ZN , then N −m ≡ −m mod N . Therefore, we
use the top half of the message space to denote negative numbers. As a result, −m
is represented by N −m. For this purpose, the message space is interpreted as the
complement arithmetic representation for N -bit integers. It should be pointed out
that in the case of an overflow, a positive number suddenly becomes a negative num-
ber or vice-versa. In order to avoid overflows, we should ensure that two intervals
are disjoint (see Figure 1).
Assume that α ∈ ZN ′ , where N ′ < N . Let S1 = {0, 1, ..., N ′} and S2 = {N −
N ′, ..., N − 1} denote positive and negative numbers respectively. An adequate
condition to ensure that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ is:
N ′ < N −N ′ ⇔ N ′ < N
2
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N/2
0 N-1N′ N-N′
Positive numbers Negative numbers
Figure 1: Using the cyclic property of the cryptosystem to represent negative num-
bers [GKKB09].
3.2.5 Additive Blinding
Additively blinding the value x means producing a uniformly random element y ∈
ZN such that any information about the value x is not disclosed by y. At first,
a random element r ∈ ZN is chosen, where the distribution of r is the discrete
uniform distribution. In this case, the probability of choosing a random variable R
is P (R = r) = 1
N
for all r ∈ ZN . Then we calculate y = r + x mod N . Since the
element y is a uniformly random element of the set ZN , no information about the
value x is revealed by y.
3.3 Geometric Preliminaries
In the following, we give necessary preliminary geometric definitions and introduce
basic concepts in linear algebra. For more details on these definitions see [LL09,
PS88, DBVKOS97, Cor08].
3.3.1 Vectors in Euclidean Space
In the Euclidean coordinate system, a vector
−→
PQ is a directed line from a point P
(initial point) to a point Q (terminal point), in which the length of the directed
line is defined as the vector’s magnitude, denoted by |−→PQ|, and its direction is the
same as the direction of the drawn line. In addition, each point P = (x, y) also can
represent one vector in the Cartesian system, where the tail of the vector is at the
origin of the Cartesian system and the head of the vector is at the point P . A zero
vector is a vector such that its initial and terminal points are the same. In fact,
a zero vector is just a point in the Cartesian system. Unless otherwise indicated,
whenever we refer to a vector as ~v = (a, b), we mean a vector starting at the origin
of the Cartesian system and ending at the point (a, b).
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Two nonzero vectors are equal if the magnitude and direction of them are the same.
Therefore, two vectors with different initial points but with the same magnitude
and direction are considered equal. By this definition, the vector
−→
PQ is equal to the
vector ~v whose initial point is at (0, 0) and its terminal point is (Qx − Px, Qy − Py).
3.3.2 Geometric Definition of Dot Product
The dot product of two vectors is one type of multiplication of two vectors which
results in a scalar. The dot product of ~v = (v1, v2) and ~w = (w1, w2), denoted by
~v · ~w, is defined as below:
~v · ~w = v1w1 + v2w2
It is possible to build a relationship between the dot product and the angle between
two vectors with the same initial point. Therefore, the geometric definition of the
dot product can be determined as:
~v · ~w = |~v| |~w| cos θ
where θ is the smallest nonnegative angle between two nonzero vectors, so that
0◦ ≤ θ ≤ 180◦. Since cos θ > 0 for 0◦ ≤ θ < 90◦ and cos θ < 0 for 90◦ < θ ≤ 180◦,
we have:
~v · ~w is

> 0 for 0◦ ≤ θ < 90◦
0 for θ = 90◦
< 0 for 90◦ < θ ≤ 180◦
As depicted in Figure 2, the dot product of two vectors ~v and ~w is positive, negative,
or zero, depending on whether the non-negative angle between them is acute, obtuse,
or a right angle, respectively. However, the exact size of the angle cannot be deduced
by the actual numerical value of the dot product.
~w
~v
0◦ ≤ θ < 90◦
(a)~v · ~w > 0
~w
~v
90◦ < θ ≤ 180◦
(b)~v · ~w < 0
~w
~v
θ = 90◦
(c)~v · ~w = 0
Figure 2: Sign of the dot product and angle between two vectors [Cor08].
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3.3.3 Geometric Definition of Determinant
A 2× 2 matrix is an array of two rows and two columns, denoted as:[
a b
c d
]
or
(
a b
c d
)
where a, b, c, d are scalars. The determinant of a matrix A, denoted by det(A) or
|A|, is a scalar value that can be calculated from the elements of such a matrix and
is defined by the following formula:
|A| =
∣∣∣∣∣a bc d
∣∣∣∣∣ = ad− bc.
Each row of a matrix can represent one vector. For the 2 × 2 matrix above, the
vectors are ~v = (a, b), and ~w = (c, d). Assume P be a parallelogram with adjacent
vectors ~v = (a, b) and ~w = (c, d), then the signed area of the parallelogram with
vertices at (0, 0), (a, b), (c, d), and (a+ c, b+ d), shown in Figure 3a, is computed as
below:
area(P ) = (a+c)(b+d)−2(1
2
ab)−2(1
2
cd)−2bc = ab+ad+cb+cd−ab−cd−2bc = ad−bc.
x
y
(0, 0)
(a, b)
(c, d)
(a+ c, b+ d)
(ad− bc)
a c
ac
b
d
b
d
(a) The signed area of the parallelogram
is equal to the determinant of the matrix
built of two vectors forming two sides of
the parallelogram.
θ
~v
~w |~w| sin θ
(b) The parallelogram with adjacent vec-
tors ~v = (a, b), ~w = (c, d) and angle θ
between them has area |~v||~w| sin θ.
Figure 3: Signed area = |~v||~w| sin θ = ad− bc.
Swapping the rows changes the sign of the determinant
∣∣∣∣∣a bc d
∣∣∣∣∣. This is why the area
is determined as “signed”. Geometric interpretation of the negative area is that the
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rotation angle from the first vector to the second vector is in a clockwise direction.
As a result, the sign of the area changes when the vertices are listed in a different
order. Note here that the rotation angle θ between first vector ~v to second vector ~w
is always chosen in such way that −180◦ < θ ≤ 180◦.
As shown in Figure 3b, the signed area of the parallelogram can also be calculated
using the sine formula where the angle of rotation (θ) from ~v to ~w ranges from −180◦
to 180◦, with negative angles corresponding to clockwise rotation, and positive angles
corresponding to counterclockwise rotation.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the sine formula can help us to predict the sign of the
determinant since sin θ is positive for 0◦ < θ < 180◦ and negative for−180◦ < θ < 0◦.
If two vectors point in either the same direction or exact opposite directions then
the corresponding determinant is zero.
~v
~w
(a) The determinant
∣∣∣∣∣vx vywx wy
∣∣∣∣∣ is positive
if ~w is in the counterclockwise rotation
angle from ~v.
~v
~w
(b) The determinant
∣∣∣∣∣vx vywx wy
∣∣∣∣∣ is negative
if ~w is in the clockwise rotation angle
from ~v.
Figure 4: Sign of determinant of two vectors ~v and ~w.
3.3.4 Smallest-Signed Angle Between Two Vectors
Assume that we have two vectors ~v = (vx, vy) and ~w = (wx, wy). In our proposed
privacy-preserving schemes for the point inclusion problem, we are interested to
compute a signed magnitude of the smallest angle that takes ~v to ~w or vice-versa.
The common mistake for calculating the angle between two vectors is shown in
Figure 5 (the right one). As shown in Figure 5, the signed magnitude of the angle
that takes ~v to ~w is -90◦, while the angle for taking ~w to ~v is +90◦.
As discussed earlier, the dot product and the determinant of two vectors ~v and ~w
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x
y ~v
~w
90.00◦
x
y ~v
~w
270.00◦
Figure 5: Angle between two vectors
are defined as follows.
~v · ~w = vxwx + vywy = |~v| |~w| cos(θ) (1)
det(~v, ~w) = vxwy − vywx = |~v| |~w| sin(θ) (2)
From Equations 1 and 2, the smallest-signed angle that takes ~v to ~w is calculated
as follows.
θ = arctan(
det(~v, ~w)
~v · ~w ) (3)
where the arctan function can be computed using atan2 function in many program-
ming languages. The atan2 is a two-argument function that is often written as
θ = tan−1(
y
x
). The atan2(y, x) calculates the angle in radian between the positive
x-axis of the Cartesian system and the point given by the coordinate (x, y) [USD11].
However, atan2 function has discontinuity when the output angle crosses pi. The
angle is positive for counter-clockwise angles (y > 0), and negative for clockwise
angles (y < 0). Thus, it produces the result in the range −pi < θ ≤ pi (Figure 6).
The definition of the atan2 is as follows [USD11].
atan2(y, x) =

arctan
(
y
x
)
if x > 0
pi + arctan
(
y
x
)
if y ≥ 0, x < 0
−pi + arctan ( y
x
)
if y < 0, x < 0
pi
2
if y > 0, x = 0
−pi
2
if y < 0, x = 0
undefined if y = 0, x = 0
For instance, the angle from the x-axis to the vector (2, 2) is pi/4 rad or 45◦, while
the angle from the x-axis to the vector (−2,−2) is −3pi/4 rad or −135◦. Therefore,
signs of two vectors are taken into account while using the atan2 function.
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Figure 6: The four-quadrant inverse tangent, atan2(y, x).
3.3.5 Blinding an Angle Between Two Vectors
The inverse tangent function satisfies the addition formula as follows.
arctan(α) + arctan(β) = arctan
( α + β
1− αβ
)
(4)
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, the smallest-signed angle that takes ~v to ~w is θ =
arctan(det(~v,~w)
~v·~w ). Therefore, in order to add randomness (i.e., θ
′) to the exact signed
angle θ, we can choose two random numbers rx and ry, such that θ′ = arctan(
ry
rx
).
According to Equation 4, the randomized angle θ + θ′ is calculated as follows.
arctan
(det(~v, ~w)
~v · ~w
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ
+arctan
(ry
rx
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ′
= arctan
[ (det(~v, ~w)) · rx + (~v · ~w) · ry
(~v · ~w) · rx − (det(~v, ~w)) · ry
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ+θ′
(5)
As we know, atan2 function has a discontinuity when the output angle crosses pi,
which can lead to discontinuity in θ + θ′. It means that sometimes the sum of two
positive angles could be negative. Similarly sometimes the sum of two negative an-
gles could be positive. For example, assume that atan2(53,−105) ≈ 153.21709◦and
atan2(60, 23) ≈ 69.02650◦. According to Equation 5, we have:
atan2(53,−105) + atan2(60, 23) = atan2(−5081,−5595) ≈ −137.75640◦
In order to avoid that, we need to make sure that the added random angle θ′ and the
actual angle θ have different signs. As depicted in Figure 6, atan2(y, x) and y have
the same signs. Therefore, if det(~v, ~w) ≥ 0, then ry should be negative. Similarly,
if det(~v, ~w) < 0, then ry should be positive. The random number rx can be either
positive or negative.
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3.3.6 Computational Geometry
Our proposed protocols borrow the angle summation algorithm from computational
geometry. As such, some basic terms and concepts utilized throughout this thesis
are defined in the following.
Figure 7: A Convex Region (left), and a Concave Region (right).
Convex and Concave Regions A convex region [DBVKOS97] has the property
that each line segment between two distinct points of the region lies completely
within the region, while in a concave region there is at least one line segment between
two different points of the region which does not lie completely within the region.
We show an example in Figure 7, illustrating convex region and concave region.
Jordan curve theorem In the Jordan curve theorem [BJMR75] a non-self-intersecting
loop in the plane, which is called a Jordan curve, divides the plane into two regions:
interior and exterior region. The former refers to the region enclosed by the curve
and the latter contains all of the exterior points.
Point in polygon problem One interesting problem in the field of computational
geometry is to check whether a given pointM is enclosed by an arbitrary polygon P
or not (this is a special case of point inclusion problem). In this thesis, we are only
interested in non-self-intersecting polygons. Two proposed solutions for solving this
problem are the even-odd rule and the winding number [HA01]. The former employs
ray-casting and latter angle summation algorithm [Wei94]. In the following, both
algorithms are described.
The ray-casting algorithm counts the number of times a ray, starting from the point
M and going in any fixed direction, crosses the edges of P . If this ray crosses
the edges of the polygon an odd number of times, the point is inside the polygon,
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otherwise it is outside (see Figure 8).
4 crossings
3 crossings
1 crossing
2 crossings
0 crossing
Figure 8: Ray-casting algorithm
The winding number algorithm counts the number of times that P travels around
the point M . It can be shown that the point M lies inside the polygon, if the
winding number is nonzero, otherwise it is outside. The winding number employs
the angle summation algorithm in order to calculate the sum of all signed angles
between the vertices of the polygon P , as viewed from the point M . Without loss
of generality, we assume M = (0, 0). As depicted in Figure 9b, the winding number
of the point M with respect to the polygon P is ω(M,P ) = 1
2pi
∑n
i=1 ϕi, where ϕi is
the signed angle between the edges MPi and MPi+1.
In this thesis, we utilize the angle summation algorithm [Wei94] to derive the answer
for the point in polygon problem. As mentioned already, we assume that P is a non-
self-intersecting polygon. Therefore, as shown in Figure 9, if point M lies inside P ,
the angle summation algorithm results in plus or minus 360 degrees, depending on
the chosen direction for naming the vertices of P . If the sum of angles is 0 degrees,
then the point M is outside of P . This algorithm will be discussed in detail in
Section 4.2.
3.4 Discretization
In practice, the latitude and longitude of any GPS location are floating point num-
bers. Latitude values (Y-values) range between −90 and +90 degrees, while longi-
tude values (X-values) range between −180 and +180 degrees. On the other hand,
Paillier encryption scheme requires the use of integers alone. Therefore, floating
point numbers should be converted to integer values in order to use them as inputs
in our privacy-preserving protocols. We map each floating point number to integer
24
x
y
M
P
α
(a) ω(M,P ) =
1
2pi
n∑
i=1
ϕi =
1
2pi
(α− α) = 0
x
y
M
P
Pi
Pi+1
ϕi
(b) ω(M,P ) =
1
2pi
n∑
i=1
ϕi
Figure 9: Winding number algorithm for the point in polygon problem.
according to the following formula: discretizee(x) = b10e · x+ 0.5c. The e param-
eter controls the shift of the decimal point. Therefore, by choosing the higher e we
can ensure that the more digits after the decimal point are preserved [ŠG14]. By
choosing e = 8, we can pinpoint a location to within 1 millimeter.
3.5 Notation
Throughout this work we use the following notations. Let us assume thatM = (a, b)
is a given point, and P is a polygon with vertices Pi, for i = 1, 2, ..., n. For two
vectors
−−→
MPi and
−−−→
MPi′ , where i′ = (i+1) mod n, the notations deti and doti denote,
respectively, the determinant and dot product of two given consecutive vectors in
the (x, y) plane. Also, by writing
〈
m
〉
for some m ∈ ZN , we refer to the encryption
of message m using a homomorphic encryption scheme (e.g. Paillier encryption).
Moreover,
〈
m
〉
pkA
specifies that the encryption is performed under the public key
pkA. To denote that a value m is to be encrypted, we also use the notation E(m).
To denote decryption, we write
m⇐ 〈m〉 or D(〈m〉).
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4 Secure Protocols for Point Inclusion Problem
This chapter is dedicated to the development of two privacy-preserving protocols
for the point-inclusion problem. Firstly, we define the system model and our design
goal. Next, we study the proposed algorithm for solving the point-inclusion problem
in complex polygonal domains without worrying about privacy concern. Finally, we
utilize the aforementioned algorithm and develop two privacy-preserving proximity
detection protocols that are applicable to arbitrary polygonal domains.
4.1 System Model and Design Goal
In this section, we describe our system model and security requirements for the
suggested schemes, and identify our design goal.
4.1.1 System Model
Our system model is similar to the proposed system model in [ZWL+18] and consists
of three main parts: 1) proxy server (PS); 2) query user (QU) who is looking for
his/her friends in one specific area; and 3) user’s friends (UFs) who are participating
in multi-party communication for proximity detection. The system model is shown
in Figure 10.
• PS is a proxy server, which acts as an intermediate layer among users while
they are engaging in secure multi-party computational geometry to find their
friends in one specific area. To enrich users’ experiences and protecting their
privacy, the exact locations of users should not be exposed to the proxy server.
In our system, the main responsibility of PS is forwarding the encrypted and
blurred data among users.
• QU is a user who is willing to find out which friends of her are within one
specific region. At first, she generates her own friends’ list and selects one
polygonal domain on the map. Then, she queries her friends in the target area.
• UF are friends of QU. In the process of secure multi-party computational
geometry, QU sends encrypted query information to each UF. After receiving
the blurred data by UF, each UF uses his/her own geographic location and
does a hybrid calculation with the encrypted data in order to get the query
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Figure 10: System model
result. Meanwhile, UF might communicate with QU to facilitate the hybrid
calculation. Afterward, the encrypted query result is only decrypted by QU
with further calculating.
4.1.2 Security Requirements
In our security model, the privacy of QU’s query information and UF’s exact location
should be ensured. We assume that QU and UF are semi-honest (see Section 3.1).
Therefore, QU and UF will follow the protocol correctly and will not send any
fake information; however, they will try to gain access to each other’s sensitive
information through keeping a record of all intermediate computations and deriving
the other party’s input. In addition, different UFs might collaborate with each other
in order to infer some sensitive information about QU’s query. Moreover, PS is semi-
honest, but it may try to obtain sensitive information of users from query requests
and responses. Finally, we assume that the data will not be tampered and modified
during the query process.
By considering the above security issues, in order to be successful in running a secure
proximity detection protocol among users, the most important security requirement
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that should be fulfilled is privacy. It means that during the query process, QU’s
geometric range query cannot be leaked to PS and UF. Meanwhile, UF’s accurate
location cannot be exposed to QU and PS. In addition, query results should be
decrypted only by QU.
4.1.3 Design Goal
Considering the aforementioned system model and security requirements, we aim to
design two efficient privacy-preserving proximity detection protocols with accurate
results for arbitrary polygonal domains. Therefore, the following three objectives
should be accomplished.
1. Privacy-preserving should be ensured: protecting users’ location data against
disclosure to other participants is the primary goal of our system design.
Therefore, our proposed schemes should achieve confidentiality.
2. Accuracy of query results for arbitrary polygonal domains should be guaran-
teed: the users’ experience is a significant aspect of our proposed schemes,
and it is necessary that the accuracy of results should not be reduced while
protecting users privacy.
3. Low communication overhead and computational complexity should be ob-
tained: since smartphones have a limited battery, the improvement in com-
munication and computation complexity can reduce energy consumption.
4.2 Algorithm
In this section, we first present the angle summation algorithm [Wei94] in plain-
text domain, and then transform the operations into the encrypted domain. As
mentioned in [Wei94], the angle summation algorithm is applicable to all com-
plex polygonal domains without partitioning a complex polygon into the num-
ber of convex pieces. The algorithm takes as inputs a polygon P with vertices
Pi = (xi, yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where the vertices are named either in the clockwise or
anticlockwise direction, and a point M = (a, b). As defined in the following, the
goal is to specify whether M lies inside P or not.
Definition 1. A point M lies inside a polygon P with vertices Pi, if the sum of all
signed angles that takes
−−→
MPi to
−−−→
MPi′ , where i = 1, 2, ..., n and i′ = (i+ 1) mod n,
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is either +360◦ or −360◦ where the chosen direction for listing the vertices of P is
in the anticlockwise or clockwise order respectively. In the case that M is outside
P , the sum of all signed angles mentioned earlier is 0◦.
Initially, the algorithm starts by determining vectors from point M to all vertices
of P . As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, a vector from point M = (a, b) to Pi = (xi, yi)
denoted by
−−→
MPi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is equal to the vector ~vi = (xi − a, yi − b) whose
initial point is at (0, 0) and its terminal point is Pi−M . In this case, we can assume
that the origin of the Cartesian system is shifted to the point M = (a, b) without
changing the orientation of the axes. As a result, the new coordinates of vertices
under translations will be given by Xi = xi − a and Yi = yi − b.
In the next step, the algorithm calculates the smallest-signed angle between every
two consecutive vectors according to the chosen direction for naming the vertices.
Therefore, by computing the dot product and determinant of every two consecutive
vectors, the signed angle between them is calculated using Equation 3.
Finally, the output is the sum of all signed angles computed in the previous step,
and it depends on the chosen direction for labeling the vertices of P . As a result,
the output is one of the following three cases:
The output is

+360◦ where M is inside P with anticlockwise-listed vertices;
−360◦ where M is inside P with clockwise-listed vertices;
0◦ where M is outside P ;
Remark. In the case of M lying on the boundary of P , the algorithm may lead
to ambiguities. In other word, the point M might be identified inside or outside of
P , depending on the shape of P and the chosen direction for naming the vertices.
In addition, if M coincides with one of the vertices of P , the algorithm mentioned
above does not work correctly, because atan2(0, 0) is undefined.
All above steps are summarized here:
Algorithm 1 The angle summation algorithm for the point inclusion problem in
complex polygonal domains.
Input: A polygon P with vertices Pi = (xi, yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a point M = (a, b).
Output: Determining whether M lies inside P or not.
Algorithm steps:
1. Moving the origin of the Cartesian system from (0, 0) to the point M = (a, b).
As a result, the new coordinates of vertices are Xi = xi − a and Yi = yi − b.
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2. For each index i, the dot product and determinant of two consecutive vectors
~vi = (xi − a, yi − b) and ~vi′ = (xi′ − a, yi′ − b), where i = 1, 2, ..., n and i′ =
(i+ 1) mod n, are computed as below:
~vi · ~vi′ = xixi′ − a(xi + xi′) + a2 + yiyi′ − b(yi + yi′) + b2 (6)
det(~vi, ~vi′) = xiyi′ − xi′yi + b(xi′ − xi) + a(yi − yi′) (7)
For simplicity, we denote the dot product and the determinant of two vectors
~vi and ~vi′ by doti and deti respectively.
3. The final result is the sum of all smallest-signed angles between every two
consecutive vectors ~vi and ~vi′ , and is calculated as follows.
output =
n∑
i=1
atan2
(
deti, doti
)
For better presentation, we examined the angle summation algorithm for different
types of polygons shown below. The algorithm works accurately for complex polygons.
x
y
x
y
x
y
x
y
x
y
x
y
Figure 11: Testing the algorithm with different types of polygons, all blue points
are recognized inside, and all red points are recognized outside the polygons.
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4.3 The Proposed Privacy-Preserving Schemes
In this section, we utilize the algorithm described in Section 4.2, as a building block,
in order to present two privacy-preserving solutions for the point-inclusion problem
in complex polygonal domains. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that the proposed privacy-preserving solutions are applicable to all concave and
convex polygons (except self-intersecting polygons). Moreover, our first solution
provides a significant reduction in computational and communication complexity
compared to the similar work.
The most challenging part of our work is to find an efficient way to compute atan2
function in a secure two-party computational protocol. We utilize some techniques
such as additively blinding a signed angle between two vectors (see Section 3.3.5) as
well as Oblivious Transfer protocol (see Section 3.2.1) in order to ensure the location
privacy of the participants during the protocol execution.
As illustrated in Section 4.1, our system model consists of a query user (QU) and
her friends. For simplicity, we present both protocols in a scenario involving just two
parties: Alice (the querier) and Bob. For example, Alice is planning to enjoy her free
time after work in one park near her workplace. She wants to know whether Bob is
also spending his free time in that park, in order to arrange some outdoor activities
together. Therefore, the problem can be stated as follows: Alice specifies an area
on the map using a polygon P with vertices Pi = (xi, yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. She can define
her polygon either in a clockwise or counterclockwise direction. Bob determines his
current location with a single point M = (a, b). Alice wants to check whether Bob
is located in her chosen area, without disclosing sensitive information regarding her
polygon to Bob, and without getting knowledge of the exact coordinates of M . In
the following, we describe both protocols in more detail.
4.3.1 Protocol 1
In our first protocol, all encryptions are performed under Alice’s public key, thus
the proximity result is only computed by Alice, and Bob does not learn the result.
We assume that, before the protocol execution, Alice has published her public key
(pkA). In order to give a general overview of Protocol 1, we summarize it in three
main steps as follows.
(a) First, using Alice’s encrypted inputs, Bob computes all encrypted deti and
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doti (defined in Section 4.2) under Alice’s public key.
(b) Next, for each index i, Bob wants to add randomness to the signed angle cor-
responding to deti and doti (i.e. atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+ θ′i), therefore he computes
the encrypted values det′i and dot′i in such a way that after decryption, Alice
gets: atan2
(
det′i, dot
′
i
)
= atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+ θ′i.
(c) Finally, Bob sends sum′ =
∑n
i=1 θ
′
i along with a list of all encrypted elements
(det′i, dot′i) to Alice.
Initially, Alice and Bob want to jointly compute Equations 6 and 7 (Step 2 of
Algorithm 1 in Section 4.2) for each edge based on their own input, without revealing
their input to the other party. Therefore, as detailed in the protocol steps further,
Alice encrypts her input for each edge using her public key. She then sends a total
of 6n ciphertexts to Bob (Step 1). Bob cannot learn anything about Alice’s input
from these ciphertexts since he does not have Alice’s private key to decrypt them.
However, by employing the properties of additively homomorphic encryption, he
incorporates his input and computes all encryptions of deti and doti (Step 2).
As discussed earlier (Section 3.3.4), each pair of (deti, doti) represents a signed angle
θi that takes
−−→
MPi to
−−−→
MPi′ , where i = 1, 2, ..., n and i′ = (i+1) mod n. Alice is inter-
ested to calculate the sum of all signed angles θi, thus getting
∑n
i=1 atan2
(
deti, doti
)
as the proximity result. However, if Alice gets the actual values of deti and doti
then she can find Bob’s exact location by solving two equations (Equations 6 and
7). Therefore, Bob should find a way to mask all actual values of deti and doti,
without compromising proximity result accuracy.
To solve the problem, Bob employs the technique suggested in Section 3.3.5 (for
each edge) and adds randomness to the signed angle corresponding to deti and doti
(i.e. atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+ θ′i). Therefore, he generates two random non-zero numbers
rxi and ryi such that θ′i = atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
. According to Equation 5 in Section 3.3.5,
Bob knows:
atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
= atan2
(
deti ·rxi+doti ·ryi , doti ·rxi−deti ·ryi
)
(8)
For convenience, throughout the rest of this work, we denote (deti · rxi + doti · ryi)
and (doti · rxi − deti · ryi) by det′i and dot′i respectively.
As discussed in Section 3.3.5, using Equation 8, the sum of two positive angles
could be a negative angle if the output angle crosses pi. Similarly, the sum of two
negative angles could be a positive angle. To avoid that, Bob should make sure that
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the signs of ryi and deti are different. As a result, the added random angle θ′i and
atan2
(
deti, doti
)
have different signs.
Since all deti are encrypted with Alice’s public key, Bob needs Alice’s help to de-
termine their signs. Therefore, Bob multiplicatively masks all encrypted deti (Step
3), by generating n random non-zero numbers r1, ..., rn (either positive or negative)
and computing E(ri · deti). The purpose of masking is to avoid Alice from deriv-
ing information regarding the sign or the actual value of deti. Bob then sends all
masked deti to Alice who decrypts them with her private key and returns back signs
of all masked deti (Step 4). Thereby, Bob can decide about the sign of ryi using the
following comparison (Step 5.a). If ri and E(ri · deti) have the same sign, it means
deti ≥ 0, then ryi should be negative. Likewise, if ri and E(ri · deti) do not have the
same sign, it means deti < 0, then ryi should be positive.
Remark. At this point, signs of all deti are disclosed to Bob. However, as will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the leaked information reveals some minor infor-
mation about Alice’s polygon to Bob in special cases, but does not violate the privacy
of the whole scheme.
Next, Bob wants to compute
(
deti ·rxi+doti ·ryi
)
and
(
doti ·rxi−deti ·ryi
)
in Equation
8. Accordingly, he employs the properties of additively homomorphic encryption
and incorporates rxi and ryi in the encrypted values deti and doti, thus getting the
encryptions of det′i and dot′i (Step 5.b). He then sends sum′ =
∑n
i=1 atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
along with a list of all encrypted elements (det′i, dot′i) to Alice who decrypts them
with her private key and computes the proximity result as follows:
θ =
( n∑
i=1
atan2
(
det′i, dot
′
i
))− sum′
The detailed protocol is described below.
Protocol 1 Privacy-Preserving Scheme for the Point Inclusion Problem
Input: Alice has a polygon P with vertices Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; her public/private
keypair. Bob has a point M = (a, b); Alice’s public key pkA.
Output: Alice knows whether M lies inside P or not.
Protocol steps:
1. Alice computes
(〈
xixi′ + yiyi′
〉
,
〈− xi− xi′〉, 〈− yi− yi′〉, 〈xi′ − xi〉, 〈yi− yi′〉,〈
xiyi′ − xi′yi
〉)
for each index i and sends these ciphertexts to Bob, where
i = 1, 2, ..., n, i′ = (i+ 1) mod n.
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2. For each index i, where i = 1, 2, ..., n, i′ = (i + 1) mod n, Bob using Alice’s
public key (pkA) computes:〈
xixi′ + yiyi′
〉 · 〈− xi − xi′〉a · 〈− yi − yi′〉b · 〈a2 + b2〉
=
〈
xixi′ + yiyi′ − a(xi + xi′)− b(yi + yi′) + a2 + b2
〉
=
〈
vi · vi′
〉
=
〈
doti
〉
pkA〈
xiyi′ − xi′yi
〉 · 〈xi′ − xi〉b · 〈yi − yi′〉a
=
〈
xiyi′ − xi′yi + b(xi′ − xi) + a(yi − yi′
〉
=
〈
det(vi, vi′)
〉
=
〈
deti
〉
pkA
3. Bob generates n random values r1, ..., rn ∈ I1−{0} (blinding factor domain is
discussed in Section 4.5) for masking the determinants, and computes:
di = (
〈
deti
〉
pkA
)ri =
〈
ri · deti
〉
pkA
1 ≤ i ≤ n
Next, he sends (d1, .., dn) back to Alice.
4. Alice decrypts the list obtained from Bob using her private key; she then
determines the sign of decrypted elements for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
If
(
D(
〈
di
〉
pkA
) ≥ 0) then signi = +1, otherwise signi = −1.
Alice sends (sign1, ..., signn) back to Bob.
5. For each i = 1, ..., n, Bob conducts the following sub-steps:
(a) Considering the following condition, Bob generates two random numbers
rxi , ryi ∈ I2 − {0} (blinding factor domain is discussed in Section 4.5).
If ri and signi have the same sign then ryi < 0 , otherwise ryi > 0.
(b) Using Equation 8, Bob calculates:〈
deti
〉rxi · 〈doti〉ryi = 〈deti · rxi + doti · ryi〉pkA = 〈det′i〉pkA〈
doti
〉rxi · 〈deti〉−ryi = 〈doti · rxi − deti · ryi〉pkA = 〈dot′i〉pkA
6. Bob sends
(
(
〈
det′1
〉
,
〈
dot′1
〉
), ..., (
〈
det′n
〉
,
〈
dot′n
〉
)
)
and sum′ =
∑n
i=1 atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
to Alice.
7. Alice decrypts all encrypted received pairs using her private key; she then
computes:
θ =
( n∑
i=1
atan2
(
det′i, dot
′
i
))− sum′
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If θ = ±360◦, the point M lies inside the polygon P . Otherwise, if θ = 0◦, M
is outside the polygon P . As explained in Section 4.2, if point M coincides
with one of the vertices of P , the result is undefined.
In the following, Protocol 1 is summarized.
Alice Bob
private input: polygon P with
vertices Pi = (xi, yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
private input: point M = (a, b)
• Encrypts her input using her
public key & sends a total of
6n ciphertexts to Bob.
• Under Alice’s public key computes:
(〈doti〉pkA , 〈deti〉pkA) 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• Generates r1, ..., rn
• For i = 1, ..., n
di = (
〈
deti
〉
)ri =
〈
ri · deti
〉
• Sends (d1, .., dn)• Decrypts and determines signs
of all elements.
• Sends (sign1, ..., signn)
• For i = 1, ..., n,
Generates rxi , ryi
〈deti〉rxi · 〈doti〉ryi = 〈det′i〉pkA
〈doti〉rxi · 〈deti〉−ryi = 〈dot′i〉pkA
• Sends sum′ =
∑n
i=1 atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
,
(〈det′1〉, 〈dot′1〉), ..., (〈det′n〉, 〈dot′n〉)
θ =
( n∑
i=1
atan2
(
det′i, dot
′
i
))− sum′
Figure 12: Protocol 1
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4.3.2 Protocol 2
The first proposed protocol reveals signs of all deti to Bob. As will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 5, the leaked information reveals some minor information about
Alice’s polygon to Bob in some scenarios. In this section, we propose another pro-
tocol trying not to reveal any additional information to the other party that might
cause privacy violations. Our proposed protocol is inspired by secure two-party
scalar product protocol presented by Atallah and Du [AD01] which already is dis-
cussed in detail in Section 2.3.
Unlike Protocol 1, this protocol performs all encryptions under Bob’s public key. We
assume that, before the protocol execution, Bob has published his public key (pkB).
Similar to the previous solution, initially, Alice and Bob want to jointly compute
Equations 6 and 7 (Step 2 of Algorithm 1 in Section 4.2) for each edge based on their
own input. In the following, we describe the detailed protocol which is presented
later in this section. At first, Alice starts the protocol by sending a request to
Bob asking him to send his encrypted coordinates (Step 2). In the next step, Bob
encrypts his inputs using his public key; he then sends a total of three ciphertexts to
Alice (Step 3). Next, Alice utilizes the homomorphic encryption properties in order
to incorporate her own input; thereby she computes all encryptions of deti and
doti (Step 5). However, if Bob gets all actual values of deti and doti, then he can
conclude some information about Alice’s polygon by solving a system of 2n nonlinear
equations (this system of equations are discussed in Section 5.1.2). Therefore, Alice
should find a way to prevent Bob from getting access to actual values of deti and
doti, without compromising proximity result accuracy.
Consider the following solution: For each index i, where i = 1, ..., n, Alice sends
two lists to Bob. The first list contains p encrypted numbers, only one of which is
〈doti〉pkB and the rest are random dot products encrypted with Bob’s public key.
Similarly, the second list contains p encrypted numbers including 〈deti〉pkB and p−1
arbitrary determinants. After decrypting the two lists, Bob computes p2 smallest
signed angles for all possible combinations of determinants and dot products using
Equation 3 (in Section 3.3.4); then he adds θ′i to all computed angles, where θ′i is a
random real number and
∑n
i=1 θ
′
i = v. The purpose of θ′i is to prevent Alice from
getting the exact signed angle between the two vectors. At the end Alice employs
the 1-out-of-p2 oblivious transfer protocol to get Zi = atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+ θ′i from
Bob (see Figure 13). Because of the way oblivious transfer protocol works, Alice
can securely get the computed angle corresponding to deti and doti, while Bob could
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not learn which one Alice has selected.
Certainly, for each index i, there is 1 out of p2 possibility that Bob can guess the
correct values of deti and doti. However, many guesses could lead to self-intersecting
polygons or improbable shapes. As a result, some of the guesses lead to more
probable polygons than others. Therefore, if we choose p and n to be large enough,
Bob’s chance of inferring sensitive information about Alice’s polygon is negligible.
Alice Bob
(〈doti〉pkB , 〈deti〉pkB)
for i = 1, ..., n
Zi = atan2
(
deti, doti) + θ
′
i 1-out-of-p2
Oblivious Transfer
hiding 〈doti〉pkB , 〈deti〉pkB
among encrypted random
numbers
〈doti〉pkB
〈deti〉pkB
Alice gets: sum′ =
∑n
i=1 Zi = (
∑n
i=1 atan2(deti, doti)) + v
Figure 13: Using the oblivious transfer protocol to present a privacy-preserving
scheme for the point inclusion problem.
Privacy guarantees: Protocol 2 provides privacy guarantees as follows:
• Alice learns only the proximity result. She cannot get Bob’s exact location by
analyzing the information exchanged during the protocol execution.
• Bob does not learn the proximity result. Furthermore, during protocol execu-
tion, the number of edges in Alice’s polygon, as well as all deti and doti hidden
among fake values are revealed to him. If Bob chooses to guess, his chance of
inferring sensitive information about Alice’s polygon is negligible if we choose
p and n to be large enough.
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The detailed protocol is described below and the OT table created at Bob’s side is
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: OT table at Bob’s side
Key Values
1 Zi,1 = atan2
(
T1, H1
)
+ θ′i
2 Zi,2 = atan2
(
T1, H2
)
+ θ′i
...
...
p Zi,p = atan2
(
T1, Hp
)
+ θ′i
p+ 1 Zi,p+1 = atan2
(
T2, H1
)
+ θ′i
...
...
p2 − 1 Zi,p2−1 = atan2
(
Tp, Hp−1
)
+ θ′i
p2 Zi,p2 = atan2
(
Tp, Hp
)
+ θ′i
Protocol 2 Privacy-Preserving Scheme for Point Inclusion Problem Using OT
Input: Bob has a point M = (a, b); his public/private keypair. Alice has a polygon
P with vertices Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; Bob’s public key pkB.
Output: Alice knows whether M lies inside P or not.
Protocol steps:
1. Alice and Bob agree on number p, such that p is large enough.
2. Alice sends a request to Bob asking him to send his encrypted coordinates.
3. Bob computes
(〈
a
〉
pkB
,
〈
b
〉
pkB
,
〈
a2 + b2
〉
pkB
)
and sends these ciphertexts to
Alice.
4. Bob generates n uniformly distributed random angles θ′1, ..., θ′n ∈ R (real num-
bers) such that v =
∑n
i=1 θ
′
i.
5. For each index i, where i = 1, 2, ..., n, i′ = (i + 1) mod n, Alice using Bob’s
public key (pkB) computes:〈
xixi′ + yiyi′
〉 · 〈a〉−(xi+xi′ ) · 〈b〉−(yi+yi′ ) · 〈a2 + b2〉
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=
〈
xixi′ + yiyi′ − a(xi + xi′)− b(yi + yi′) + a2 + b2
〉
=
〈
vi · vi′
〉
=
〈
doti
〉
pkB〈
xiyi′ − xi′yi
〉 · 〈b〉(xi′−xi) · 〈a〉(yi−yi′ )
=
〈
xiyi′ − xi′yi + b(xi′ − xi) + a(yi − yi′
〉
=
〈
det(vi, vi′)
〉
=
〈
deti
〉
pkB
6. For each i = 1, ..., n, Alice and Bob do the following sub-steps:
(a) Alice generates two secret random numbers k1 and k2 in the range [1, p].
(b) Alice sends two lists to Bob: H = (H1, ..., Hp) and T = (T1, ..., Tp), where
Hk1 = 〈doti〉pkB and Tk2 = 〈deti〉pkB , and the rest of Hj’s and Tj’s are
random dot products and determinants encrypted with Bob’s public key
respectively. Since k1 and k2 are secret numbers known only to Alice, the
position of 〈doti〉pkB and 〈deti〉pkB are unknown to Bob.
(c) Bob decrypts two lists H and T using his private key, thus getting
DB(H) and DB(T ), then creates an OT table with p2 entries shown in
Table 1, such that:
Zi,(j−1)p+k = atan2
(
Tj, Hk
)
+ θ′i 1 ≤ j ≤ p 1 ≤ k ≤ p
(d) Alice employs the 1-out-of-p2 Oblivious Transfer protocol and gets Zi =
Zi,(k2−1)p+k1 = atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+ θ′i, while Bob does not learn anything
about (k2 − 1)p+ k1.
7. Bob sends v =
∑n
i=1 θ
′
i to Alice.
8. Alice calculates:
θ =
n∑
i=1
Zi − v =
n∑
i=1
atan2
(
deti, doti
)
If θ = ±360◦, the point M lies inside the polygon P . Otherwise, if θ = 0◦, M
is outside the polygon P . As explained in Section 4.2, if point M coincides
with one of the vertices of P , the result is undefined.
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4.4 Hiding the Number of Vertices
Both proposed protocols reveal the number of edges in Alice’s polygon to Bob. In
this section, we propose a hiding strategy that enables Alice to protect the number
of edges in her polygon against disclosure to Bob during protocol execution. The
key idea is the following. Before executing the protocol, in one preprocessing phase,
Alice increases the number of vertices in her polygon by adding some random points
on each edge of the polygon (see Figure 14). Therefore, she prevents Bob from
learning the number of edges in her chosen polygon. Moreover, the added vertices
do not affect the accuracy of the result. If Bob chooses to guess, his chance of
guessing the correct number of edges is 1 out of n +m, where m is the number of
added vertices.
Figure 14: Adding random points on each edge of P .
4.5 Random Blinding Factor Domain
In this section, we take a closer look at how to choose the random blinding factor
domain in Protocol 1 which will not cause an overflow (a positive number suddenly
becomes a negative number or vice-versa). As discussed in Section 3.2.4, we use
the top half of the message space for representing negative numbers. For security
considerations, all randomly chosen blinding factors in Protocol 1 must be either
positive or negative. The representation of negative numbers follows the standard
two’s complement representation, and thus the range of supported numbers for δ
bits is from −2δ−1 to (2δ−1 − 1). Besides, we assume that all random variables are
uniformly chosen as described with more details in the following.
In Step 3 of Protocol 1, Bob masks the real values of determinants by multiplying
them in random blinding factors ri (i.e,
〈
ri ·deti
〉
). Moreover, in Step 5 of Protocol 1,
Bob generates random blinding factors rxi and ryi , then he computes the blinded
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values of determinants and dot products as follows.
〈
deti · rxi + doti · ryi
〉
=
〈
det′i
〉〈
doti · rxi − deti · ryi
〉
=
〈
dot′i
〉
Let us assume that the maximum value of deti and doti is represented with n′. As
shown in Figure 15, the blinding factor ri should be chosen in a way that does not
cause deti to overflow, which would lead to an incorrect result. Moreover, it should
be large enough to statistically hide the magnitudes of deti from Alice. As a result,
the following condition should be satisfied.
0 N − 1
N/2
n′ ri · n′ N − n′N − ri · n′
Positive numbers Negative numbers
Figure 15: Random blinding factor domain in Protocol 1.
ri · n′ < N − ri · n′ ⇔ ri < N2n′ ⇒
ri is in order of α = logN − (log n′ + 1) bits.
ri ∈ I1 − {0} where I1 = {−2α−1, ..., (2α−1 − 1)}
Since binary addition requires a carry bit, the length of rxi and ryi should be at least
one bit less than ri. Therefore, it can be concluded that:
rxi ,ryi <
N
4n′ ⇒
rxi ,ryi are in order of β = logN − (log n′ + 2) bits.
rxi ,ryi ∈ I2 − {0} where I2 = {−2β−1, ..., (2β−1 − 1)}
Example 4.1. Let us set logN = 1024 and log n′ = 64. In this case, ri is in order
of 959 bits, sufficiently large to obtain a strong degree of protection through random
blinding, and the range of supported numbers is from −2958 to (2958 − 1) (excluding
0). Similarly, rxi and ryi are in order of 958 bits and the range of supported numbers
is from −2957 to (2957 − 1) (excluding 0).
Remark. As explained in Section 3.4, during the protocol execution, floating point
values are converted to fixed precision. Thus, if we choose e = 6 (large enough to
get the accurate result) then 64 bits are sufficient for representing deti and doti.
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5 Evaluation
This chapter assesses the security and performance aspects of two suggested privacy-
preserving protocols for the point-inclusion problem. The security of the proposed
schemes is evaluated with respect to the security requirements presented in Section
4.1.2. In addition, the performance of the suggested protocols is evaluated in terms
of computation complexity and communication overhead.
5.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we take a closer look at the security of two protocols. In our schemes,
all encryptions are performed using Paillier cryptosystem, a homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme, which is semantically secure (defined in Section 3.2.3). To demonstrate
the security of the protocols, the view of each party is scrutinized using its inputs
and outputs. Then we investigate how our proposed privacy-preserving schemes
preserve the privacy of the participants against a curious Alice and a curious Bob.
5.1.1 Security Analysis of Protocol 1
Bob’s view of the protocol
Bob’s input is a fixed point M = (a, b); he has no output. In Step 1, Bob receives
a total of 6n ciphertexts from Alice. The semantic security of Paillier cryptosys-
tem prevents Bob from deriving any information regarding Alice’s real input from
these ciphertexts. Furthermore, in Step 4, signs of all determinants are revealed to
Bob. Therefore, a curious Bob might attempt to deduce some information regard-
ing Alice’s polygon (e.g, shape, size and location) from the obtained signs. In the
following, a comprehensive analysis of different cases that might happen is provided.
Consider that the disclosed signs to Bob are as follows: Sign(det) = {++−+−}.
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, geometric interpretation of a positive determinant
sign indicates that the rotation angle between two vectors, starting from Bob’s loca-
tion to two consecutive vertices of the polygon, is in a counter-clockwise direction,
while a negative sign indicates that the rotation angle is in a clockwise direction.
Two possible selected directions for listing the vertices of P are either clockwise or
counter-clockwise, which is a secret parameter known only to Alice. Another un-
known parameter to Bob is the proximity result. In our scheme, the proximity result
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is computed only by the querier (Alice). If Bob learns the result, it might provide
incentives for Bob to collude with other participating entities in order to infer some
sensitive information about Alice’s query. As a result, Alice’s query would be di-
vulged. Figure 16 and 17 depict some possible polygons that might be drawn by
Bob in his attempt to learn some information about Alice’s polygon according to his
location at query time. In the former, the counter-clockwise direction is chosen for
drawing the polygons, and in the latter the clockwise direction. It can be seen that
the drawn polygons have different shapes, with arbitrary sizes, located in different
locations. Consequently, if Bob chooses to guess, his chance of guessing the exact P
seems very small.
Bob
Figure 16: Drawn polygons in Counterclockwise direction.
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Bob
Figure 17: Drawn polygons in Clockwise direction.
There are two special cases that need to be considered separately including cases
where all obtained signs are either positive or negative. Therefore, the information
that is concluded by Bob is as follows. In both cases, he learns that he encloses
by Alice’s polygon. Moreover, he learns about the chosen direction for naming the
vertices of P . If all signs are positive, the polygon’s vertices are named in the an-
ticlockwise direction. Likewise, the clockwise direction is chosen for naming the
polygon’s vertices, if all signs are negative. Figure 18 shows some possible polygons
that might be guesstimate by Bob where all obtained signs are either positive or
negative. Due to the variety of drawn polygons, the probability of deriving infor-
mation regarding the exact shape and size of Alice’s polygon, in reality, is very low
(almost near zero).
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Bob
Figure 18: Samples of selected areas by Bob where all obtained signs are either
positive or negative.
It is noteworthy that in Protocol 1, we assume that the party who owns the polygon
(Alice) is the querier. However, with a slight modification to our first protocol, it is
possible for the other party who owns the fixed point (Bob) to initiate a proximity
detection query. One such scenario is demonstrated in [SS05] when a user wants
to privately determine whether he is located inside the sensing area of a pervasive
sensor network or not. In this case, our proposed privacy-preserving scheme cannot
preserve the privacy of Alice’s polygon against chosen-point attack performed by
Bob. In the following, more detail and elaboration about this attack is provided.
At first, Bob sends a proximity detection query to Alice, and he obtains a list (e.g,
S1) containing signs of all determinants with respect to his location at the query
time. In the next step, he changes his location a bit. Then he sends another query
to Alice which results in obtaining another list of signs (e.g, S2). Since he has
moved a bit, he can determine if he has crossed one edge of the polygon (or the line
determined by one edge of the polygon). In the case of crossing, by comparing S2
to S1, one sign has changed from positive to negative or vice-versa. Therefore, he
can mark the crossing point as one critical point. By repeating the above steps, Bob
gets a list of critical points. Therefore, by determining which points are collinear, he
can connect them together and obtains sensitive information about Alice’s polygon
including shape, size, and its location. In such a scenario, one possible solution
for Alice is to accept only limited number of queries originated from Bob. The
chosen-point attack against Alice’s polygon is depicted in Figure 19.
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Bob
Figure 19: Chosen-point attack against Alice’s polygon originated from Bob. Red
dots are such location of Bob that one of the signs has swapped.
Alice’s view of the protocol
Alice’s input is n vertices and her output is θ =
(∑n
i=1 atan2
(
det′i, dot
′
i
))− sum′.
In step 3, Alice receives a list of n randomized determinants (i.e, E(ri · deti)) from
Bob. The randomization resulted from ri ∈ I1 − {0} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (see Section
4.5), which can statistically hide deti from Alice. At the same time, ri will not
cause deti to overflow, which would lead to an incorrect result. Here, we have
a minor note. Since the blinding factors are non-zero, if Alice receives one zero
among all masked values, she learns that the related determinant would be zero.
From the geometric perspective, if two vectors point in either the same direction or
exact opposite directions then the corresponding determinant is zero (as shown in
Figure 20)
~v~w
(a) If two vectors point in exact oppo-
site directions then det(~v, ~w) = 0 and
dot(~v, ~w) < 0.
~v
~w
(b) If two vectors point in the same direc-
tion then det(~v, ~w) = 0, dot(~v, ~w) > 0.
Figure 20
Consequently, she concludes that Bob is located either on one of the polygon edges
or on the line determined by one edge of the polygon. If final output determines
that Bob is inside the polygon, then Alice learns Bob is located on one of the
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polygon edges. One possible solution for Bob is to permute the list of all masked
determinants before sending them to Alice. The purpose of permutation is to reduce
Alice’s chance of guessing the correct edge (or a line segment) on which Bob might
be located (as demonstrated in Figure 21). It is worth noting that, in reality, the
chance of being located on the edge of one chosen geographic area is very small. By
improving the granularity of the location measurement, the chance of being located
on the edge is further decreased. Note that the granularity of the measurement could
even be made artificially more fine-grained by including random digits to achieve
accuracy for millimeter (or even micrometer) range.
Figure 21: Red points show some locations that Bob might be located in when one
determinant is zero.
Furthermore, in Step 6, Alice receives (
〈
det′i
〉
,
〈
dot′i
〉
) for i = 1, ..., n, and sum′ =∑n
i=1 atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
from Bob. For convenience of discussion, let θi denote the exact
signed angle that takes
−−→
MPi to
−−−−→
MPi+1.
As we know: deti · rxi + doti · ryi = det′idoti · rxi − deti · ryi = dot′i
It follows that:
(rxi − ryi)deti + (rxi + ryi)doti = det′i + dot′i
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where rxi , ryi ∈ I2 − {0} (see Section 4.5). The purpose of rxi and ryi are to statis-
tically hide the real deti and doti from Alice. Moreover, they will add randomness
to θi, which will prevent Alice from guessing the location of Bob. That is
atan2
(
deti, doti
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θi
+ atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ′i
= atan2
(
det′i, dot
′
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θi+θ′i
where θi ∈ (−pi, pi], θi + θ′i ∈ (−pi, pi) and θ′i ∈ (−pi, pi) − {−pi2 , 0, pi2}. At the same
time, θ′i will not cause θi to overflow, which would lead to an incorrect result.
There is one special case that needs to be considered more carefully. If the value of
θi+ θ
′
i is close to pi or −pi, then Alice might conclude some information about Bob’s
location. Let us clarify the situation with an example. Assume that θi + θ′i = 175◦.
Two possible estimations for the values of θi and θ′i are as follows.
1. The exact signed angle θi ∈ (175◦, 180◦], and the added random angle θ′i ∈
[−5◦, 0). In this case, Bob lies near the ith edge of Alice’s polygon.
2. The exact signed angle θi ∈ (−5◦, 0], and the added random angle θ′i ∈
[175◦, 180◦). In this case, Bob is located far away from the ith edge of Al-
ice’s polygon.
In some cases, it is even possible to rule out one of the above options. For example,
let us consider the following situation. If the proximity result shows that Bob is
located inside Alice’s polygon, by considering the shape and size of the polygon, Alice
might figure out that the chance of Bob locating inside her chosen area, together
with θi near to zero is almost impossible. Therefore, she concludes that Bob is
located near the ith edge of her polygon.
One possible way to mitigate this problem is to permute the list of all pairs (
〈
det′i
〉
,
〈
dot′i
〉
)
for i = 1, ..., n, before sending them to Alice. In this case, Alice’s chance of guessing
the correct edge is 1 out of n. Another possible mitigation is to provide Bob with one
security parameter (before executing the protocol). Therefore, he can supervise the
chosen random numbers rxi and ryi , such that the value of θ′i = atan2
(
ryi , rxi
)
would
not be close to pi, −pi and 0. Since the security parameter is known only to Bob,
Alice cannot derive sensitive information that might violate the privacy of Bob’s
location. However, the solution suggested above deserves further investigation.
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5.1.2 Security Analysis of Protocol 2
Alice’s view of the protocol
Alice’s input consists of n vertices and her output is θ =
∑n
i=1 Zi − v. In Step 3,
Alice receives a total of 3 ciphertexts from Bob (encrypted with Bob’s public key).
The semantic security of Paillier cryptosystem prevents Alice from deriving any
information regarding Bob’s real input from these ciphertexts. Furthermore, in Step
6(d) and 7, Alice gets Zi = atan2
(
deti, doti
)
+θ′i, where i = 1, ..., n, and v =
∑n
i=1 θ
′
i.
The purpose of θ′i is to add randomness to the signed angle between the edges
MPi and MPi+1, where M is Bob’s location. Since θ′i is a random element of the
set R (real numbers), the random masking provides encryption that resembles the
one-time pad (OTP), which is proved to provide perfect secrecy [Sha49]. Therefore,
Alice’s chance of guessing the exact location of Bob is very small.
Bob’s view of the protocol
Bob’s input is a fixed point M = (a, b); he has no output. In Step 6(b), Bob receives
a total of 2n lists from Alice; each list contains p encrypted elements (one real
determinant or dot product hidden among p−1 random elements). Therefore, there
is 1 out of p possibility that Bob might guess one correct deti or doti. However,
many random combinations could lead to self-intersecting polygons or improbable
shapes. If Bob chooses to guess, his chance of inferring sensitive information about
Alice’s polygon is negligible if we choose p and n to be large enough.
In a case of guessing all exact values, then Bob should solve a system of nonlinear
equations as explained in the following.
Let us assume that Alice’s polygon has only 3 vertices. First, Bob defines vectors
~v1, ~v2, ~v3 as follows.
~v1 = (x1 − a, y1 − b), ~v2 = (x2 − a, y2 − b), ~v3 = (x3 − a, y3 − b)
Then he builds a system of equations as:
~v1 · ~v2 = dot1, ~v2 · ~v3 = dot2, ~v3 · ~v1 = dot3,
det(~v1, ~v2) = det1, det(~v2, ~v3) = det2, det(~v3, ~v1) = det3
As defined in Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, geometric definition of the dot product and
determinant can be determined as:
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|~v1| |~v2| cosϑ12 = dot1, |~v2| |~v3| cosϑ23 = dot2, |~v3| |~v1| cosϑ31 = dot3,
|~v1| |~v2| sinϑ12 = det1, |~v2| |~v3| sinϑ23 = det2, |~v3| |~v1| sinϑ31 = det3
Where ϑij is the angle between vectors ~vi and ~vj. By squaring the above equations
and using sin2 t+ cos2 t = 1, Bob gets:
|~v1| |~v2| = c1, |~v2| |~v3| = c2, |~v3| |~v1| = c3
Where ci =
√
dot2i + det
2
i . Thus, he can find the length of |~vi|, by solving the
following equations.
|~v1| =
√
c1c3
c2
, |~v2| =
√
c1c2
c3
, |~v3| =
√
c2c3
c1
.
As a result, by solving the above equations1, Bob gets sensitive information regarding
the location, shape, and size of P . It is noteworthy that solving the above equations
even with having some exact values of deti and doti, might still reveal sensitive
information about Alice’s polygon to Bob.
1We thank user @Ennar in the mathematics community of https://stackexchange.com/ who
helped us to solve this system of equations.
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5.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed protocols regarding
computation complexity, round complexity and communication overhead. The com-
putation complexity is expressed in terms of the number of operations required
to compute the result. The communication overhead is expressed in terms of the
amount of data exchanged between two parties during the protocol execution, while
the round complexity is the number of communication rounds.
Let us assume that N is modulus in Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme, and
n is the number of vertices in Alice’s polygon. In the following, we analyze the
performance of the two protocols.
5.2.1 Computation Complexity
Table 2 shows a list of notations representing operation costs used throughout this
section. Small exponents are involved when a party multiplies its plaintext into one
ciphertext, while large exponents are involved in multiplicative masking operations
using randomly chosen large numbers. For simplicity, the cost of addition as well as
choosing random numbers are neglected.
Table 2: Notations of operation costs
Encryption Te
Decryption Td
Inversion Ti
Modular exponentiation (small exponent) Tse
Modular exponentiation (large exponent) Tle
Modular multiplication Tm
Inverse tangent Tatan2
Computation cost of OT1p2 for Alice TOTA
Computation cost of OT1p2 for Bob TOTB
Remark. We assume that in reality about half of the modular exponentiations will
be performed with a negative exponent since the inputs of both parties, as well as the
chosen random numbers, could be negative.
Protocol 1: In Step 1 of Protocol 1, Alice does 6n encryptions. Next, in Steps 2
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and 3, Bob conducts 1 encryption, 4n modular exponentiations (small exponent), n
modular exponentiations (large exponent) and 5n modular multiplications. In Step
4, Alice does n decryptions. Afterward, in Steps 5 and 6, Bob performs 4n modular
exponentiations (large exponent), 2n modular multiplications, and n inverse tan-
gents. Finally in Step 7, Alice does 2n decryptions and n inverse tangents. In the
following, the computation cost per each party, as well as total computation cost, is
calculated.
Alice’s computation cost: 6nTe + 3nTd + nTatan2
Bob’s computation cost: Te + 4nTse + 5nTle + 5nTi + 7nTm + nTatan2
Total computation cost: (6n+1)Te+3nTd+4nTse+5nTle+7nTm+5nTi+2nTatan2
Protocol 2: In Step 3 of Protocol 2, Bob does 3 encryptions. Next, in Step 5,
Alice conducts 2n encryptions, 4n modular exponentiations (small exponent) and
5n modular multiplications. Finally, in Step 6, Alice and Bob employ n times 1-
out-of-p2 Oblivious Transfer protocol. Moreover, Alice does a total of 2n(p − 1)
encryptions, meanwhile, Bob conducts a total of 2np decryptions and np2 inverse
tangents. Accordingly, the computation cost is calculated as follows.
Alice’s computation cost: 2npTe + 4nTse + 2nTi + 5nTm + nTOTA
Bob’s computation cost: 3Te + 2npTd + np2Tatan2 + nTOTB
Total computation cost: (2np+ 3)Te + 2npTd + 4nTse + 2nTi + 5nTm + np2Tatan2 +
n(TOTA + TOTB)
5.2.2 Communication Overhead
In this section, we measure the communication cost of both protocols in bits. For
simplicity, the communication cost of sending plaintext data is neglected. If N
is modulus in Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme, then a ciphertext has a
maximum size of 2 logN bits. Moreover, the communication cost of invoking 1-out-
of-p2 Oblivious Transfer protocol is denoted by COT .
Protocol 1: In Step 1 of Protocol 1, Alice sends a total of 6n ciphertexts to Bob.
Next, in Step 3 and 6, Bob sends a total of 3n ciphertexts back to Alice. Therefore,
the overall communication cost is 18n logN(= 9n× 2 logN) bits.
Protocol 2: In Step 3 of Protocol 2, Bob sends 3 ciphertexts to Alice. Next,
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in Step 6, Alice and Bob employ n times 1-out-of-p2 Oblivious Transfer protocol.
Meanwhile, Alice sends a total of 2pn ciphertexts to Bob. Therefore, the overall
communication cost is (4pn+ 6) logN(= (2pn+ 3)× 2 logN) + nCOT bits.
5.2.3 Communication Round
Here, the round complexity of the two protocols is presented with respect to the
number of communication needed to compute the result.
Protocol 1: Alice and Bob exchange messages four times.
Protocol 2: This protocol relies on the 1-out-of-p2 Oblivious Transfer protocol
that should be invoked n times to make the inclusion judgment. Thus, the round
complexity of Protocol 2 is O(n).
5.2.4 Implementation Results
In this section, we use the cost of cryptographic primitives presented in [MB16], in
order to estimate the computation cost of our proposed protocols in a real implemen-
tation (see Table 3). As can be seen, the cost of encryption, decryption and modular
large exponentiation are much higher compared to modular small exponentiation and
modular multiplication. Moreover, as mentioned in [LT05], each inversion takes one
modular multiplication. Therefore, for simplicity, we just consider the computation
cost of encryption, decryption and modular large exponentiation in our estimation,
and the cost of other operations (i.e., inversion, modular small exponentiation, mod-
ular multiplication and inverse tangent) are neglected. Let us set logN = 1024 and
p = 10. In the following, the costs of both protocols are estimated.
Table 3: Cost of cryptographic primitives (ms) [MB16]
Paillier cryptosystem
Encryption 17.14
Decryption 15.69
Modular exponentiation (small exponent) 0.52
Modular exponentiation (large exponent) 16.15
Modular multiplication 0.017
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Figure 22: Computation complexity and communication overhead of Protocol 1.
Figure 22 shows the estimated CPU time required at the two parties, and the overall
communication overhead in Protocol 1, when the number of edges varies. Both costs
scale linearly with the number of edges in Alice’s polygon. Moreover, Alice’s CPU
time increases more sharply than Bob’s CPU time, since Alice needs to perform a
lot of encryptions and decryptions to compute the result.
We compared our results with similar protocol proposed in [MB16] for a rectangular
region2. In [MB16], the total computational cost is around 2 seconds, while in our
protocol (Protocol 1) the total estimated time is about 0.95 seconds, increasing
computational efficiency by up to 52.5%. Moreover, the rectangular region incurs a
communication cost of 90 KB in [MB16], while the incurred communication cost in
Protocol 1 is about 9.2 KB, almost reducing the communication complexity by up
to 89.7%. Therefore, we have achieved a significant reduction of the communication
overhead and the computation complexity in Protocol 1 compared to [MB16].
Figure 23 shows the approximate time and communication complexity of Protocol 2.
Since 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol has been extensively studied in various
flavors and security models (cf. [Ste98, NP99, AIR01, NP01, Tze02, CO15]), the
cost of this protocol would differ depending on the chosen scheme. In [Tze02], Tzeng
gives an efficient 1-out-of-N OT that is secure in the random oracle model. In his
proposed protocol, the receiver (Alice) needs to compute 2 modular exponentiations
and the sender (Bob) computes 2N modular exponentiations. Meanwhile, a total of
2N + 1 ciphertexts are exchanged between two parties.
2A rectangular region would probably be the most common area defined by Alice
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Let us employ the 1-out-of-N OT proposed in [Tze02] in our estimation in order to
estimate the complexity of the 1-out-of-p2 oblivious transfer protocol in our solution.
The cost of modular exponentiation in ElGamal cryptosystem presented in [MB16]
is 1.38 ms. In our estimation, we set p = 10. Thus, if the number of edges is equal
to fifty (i.e., n = 50), the probability that Bob might guess some information about
Alice’s polygon is much less in comparison with the case when the number of edges
is equal to 4. However, setting n = 50 demands fifty times OT invocations that can
be considered as the performance bottleneck regarding computation complexity and
communication overhead.
4 10 20 35 50
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Number of edges
C
P
U
T
im
e
(s
)
Computation Complexity of Protocol 2
Alice’s cost
Bob’s cost
4 10 20 35 50
100
300
500
700
900
1,100
1,300
1,500
1,600
Number of edges
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
co
st
(K
B
)
Communication cost of Protocol 2
Protocol 2
Figure 23: Computation complexity and communication overhead of Protocol 2.
By comparing the performance of both protocols, we can conclude that the com-
munication overhead of Protocol 2 is about 13 times that of Protocol 1 that does
not employ the oblivious transfer protocol. Moreover, the total computational cost
of Protocol 2 is about 4 times that of Protocol 1. Therefore, Protocol 1 is more
efficient than Protocol 2.
5.3 Privacy-Performance Trade-off
Figure 24 displays a graphical representation of the proposed protocols with respect
to the privacy-performance trade-off achieved. As it is illustrated, in overall, Proto-
col 1 has better performance than Protocol 2. However, better efficiency is achieved
by sacrificing the privacy of participants in relatively minor cases as discussed be-
fore. On the other hand, Protocol 2 provides stronger privacy protection for both
parties during the protocol execution.
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Figure 24: Privacy-Performance Trade-off
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we investigated the point-in-polygon problem for complex polygonal
domains; then we utilized the angle summation algorithm to address the private
proximity detection for arbitrary concave or convex polygons. In this regard, we
proposed two privacy-preserving protocols for the point-inclusion problem that al-
lows a user to define an arbitrary geographic region on the map and check whether
his/her friend is located therein. The proposed protocols are based on the secure
two-party computation. It is noteworthy that extending our solution for use with
more than two parties is straightforward and requires multiple executions of a pro-
tocol.
We also have analyzed the computation, round and communication complexity of
both proposed protocols. The complexity analysis demonstrates that Protocol 1 has
far better performance than Protocol 2. Since Protocol 2 employs the 1-out-of-N
oblivious transfer protocol, the large number of OT invocations is considered as
the performance bottleneck regarding computation complexity and communication
overhead. However, Protocol 2 is more secure than Protocol 1, and provides stronger
privacy protection for private inputs of two parties. It guarantees that no sensitive
information regarding the location of two involved parties is disclosed to the other
party. Moreover, in comparison with previous solutions, Protocol 1 reduces the
number of communication rounds significantly.
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Future Work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the proposed privacy-
preserving protocols for the point-inclusion problem are applicable to all complex
polygonal domains without partitioning a complex polygon into the number of con-
vex pieces. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are some occasions that the privacy
of users might be violated. For this reason, we believe that our proposed protocols
could be further improved to provide more privacy. In the following, several issues
that deserve further investigation are outlined.
In this thesis, we have assumed that the two parties are semi-honest. However, there
could be malicious adversaries that try to manipulate the protocol result by sending
corrupted data. Therefore, some advanced investigation approaches are needed to
detect such adversaries and fake data.
From a technical point of view, some optimizations need a deeper investigation.
Firstly, the utilized point-in-polygon algorithm can be refined to handle special
cases, e.g., Bob might coincide with one of the vertices of P or may lie on one of
P ’s edges. In [HA01], a detection algorithm for a vertex or an edge coincidence is
suggested that might be applicable to our proposed privacy-preserving protocols.
Secondly, Protocol 1 can be optimized to protect the signs of determinants against
disclosure to Bob. As a result, protecting the privacy of Alice’s polygon against a
chosen-point attack will be accomplished. The Secure Absolute Value Sub Protocol
proposed in [JTH12] might give some ideas for further improvements.
Another issue that should be addressed is that if Bob lies inside Alice’s proximity
area then some sensitive information might be divulged. The reason is that Alice
could specify a very small area on the map, such as a mosque, church or a hospital,
without Bob’s approval. One possible solution suggested in [MB16] is to allow Bob to
define a specific threshold aiming that he would not be found within an area smaller
than the defined threshold. Therefore, Bob can supervise his location disclosure
during the protocol execution. However, utilizing the aforementioned solution in
our proposed protocols needs further investigation.
Another direction we are considering is a protection solution against brute-force
attack. Our proposed privacy-preserving schemes cannot preserve the privacy of
Bob’s location against brute-force attack planned by Alice, i.e. she can initiate a
series of proximity detection queries covering the whole area where Bob might be
located. One proposed solution for Bob is to reject consecutive queries originated
from Alice that are not sufficiently apart in time.
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